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Abstract—By  managing the authority assigned to each applica-
tion, rule-based application-oriented access controls can signifi-
cantly mitigate the threats posed by malicious code due to soft-
ware  vulnerabilities  or  malware.  However,  these  policies  are 
typically complex and difficult to develop. Learning modes can 
ease specification; however, they still require high levels of exper-
tise  to  utilise  correctly,  and  are  most  suited  to  confining  non-
malicious software. 
This paper presents a novel approach to automating policy 
specification for rule-based application-oriented access controls. 
The functionality-based application confinement (FBAC) model 
provides  reusable  parameterised  abstractions.  A  number  of 
straightforward  yet  effective  techniques  are  presented  that  use 
these functionality-based abstractions to create application poli-
cies a priori; that is, without running programs before policies 
are specified. These techniques automate the specification of pol-
icy  details  by  analysing  program  dependencies,  program  man-
agement information, and filesystem contents. 
Keywords-application-oriented  access  control;  policy 
automation;  a  priori  policy  specification;  policy  abstraction; 
functionality-based application confinement; sandboxing 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Application-oriented access controls have the potential to 
overcome shortcomings of traditional user-oriented approaches 
to access control. By managing the authority granted to appli-
cations, rather than to users, application-oriented access con-
trols can limit the damage from applications acting maliciously 
due to malware or software vulnerabilities. 
Isolation-based application-oriented access controls — such 
as  traditional  sandboxes  [1,  2],  virtual  machines  [3,  4],  and 
containers [5, 6] — isolate all of the confined programs within 
a restricted environment to only access a simple pre-defined set 
of  resources  accessible  from  within  that  sandbox.  Although 
isolation-based approaches are relatively easy to initially con-
figure, they do not typically allow confined applications with 
different privilege requirements to interact without circumvent-
ing the isolation mechanism, and do not suit typical user work-
flows: for example, using one program to create a file, another 
to edit it, and a third program to share the file. 
In contrast, rule-based application-oriented access controls 
define what each application is authorised to do, typically in 
terms of finely-grained privileges. This approach allows appli-
cations to cooperate and share resources, while confining each 
application to only perform the actions and access the resources 
that are required for the program to function as expected. Ex-
amples of rule-based schemes include Janus [7], Systrace [8], 
AppArmor [9], SELinux [10], and TOMOYO [11]. Rule-based 
application restrictions can greatly mitigate the threat posed by 
malicious code, and these approaches can avoid many of the 
limitations  of  isolation-based  approaches.  However,  finely 
grained controls typically result in policy management com-
plexity, leading to usability problems. Consequently these sys-
tems often rely on learning modes to develop policy; although, 
as discussed in the next section, learning modes themselves can 
pose problems. 
This  paper  presents  a  number  of  automation  techniques, 
unique within the field, that can ease the specification of rule-
based  application-oriented  access  control  policies.  This  ap-
proach to automation leverages advantages of a functionality-
based approach to policy [12] (such as reusable parameterised 
policy abstractions [13]) to provide a priori policy specifica-
tion. That is, the construction of policies without having to first 
run the application to be confined. These techniques can im-
prove  the  usability  of  rule-based  application-oriented  access 
controls,  and  enable  end  users  to  specify  policies  to  protect 
themselves against the programs they run [14]. 
A Linux-based implementation, known as FBAC-LSM, has 
been developed, which demonstrates the efficacy of these tech-
niques [15]. 
II.  APPLICATION CONFINEMENT AND AUTOMATION 
Previous  application-oriented  access  controls,  including 
Systrace  [8],  AppArmor  [9],  SELinux  [10],  and  TOMOYO 
[11], typically rely on learning mode tools in order to create 
policies to confine applications. Learning mode tools are the 
most common approach to mitigating the usability problems 
associated with the policy complexity of finely-grained appli-
cation-oriented  access  controls.  These  tools  generate  policy 
rules based on observing the actions of the programs that are to 
be confined. Generating policy in this way can usually be per-
formed either while running the program unconfined, or while 
a policy is enforced. Either way, there are a number of draw-
backs to this approach of constructing policy. Typically, rules 
are created while the program is unconfined. However, in this 
case, if the program behaves maliciously, then the program can 
do  damage  to  the  system  and  expose  users’  files  to  misuse 
while the policy is being constructed. On the other hand, if the 
program is being confined while policy is created, the program 
will typically need to be run many times in order to identify all 
the rules required in order for the program to successfully load 
and execute. In either case, the user creating the policy must 
carefully vet each of these rules to ensure that the program does 
indeed require access to the resources it tries to access. A us-
ability study has shown that many end-users do not have the 
expertise required to correctly utilise learning modes [14].  The  functionality-based  application  confinement  (FBAC) 
model has been proposed as a way of modelling the authority 
granted to applications using reusable policy abstractions [12]. 
Policy abstractions, known as functionalities, are used to assign 
authority  to  applications based  on  the  features  they  provide. 
Functionalities authorise elaborate sets of finely grained privi-
leges based on high-level security goals, and adapt to the needs 
of specific applications through parameterisation.  
The FBAC model separates the bulk of program analysis 
and rule specification from the task of specifying policies for 
individual applications.  Since  FBAC  application  policies are 
constructed  using  high-level  abstractions,  use  of  a  learning 
mode is not required in order to create an application policy, 
and these abstractions make FBAC particularly well suited to 
automation. The automation techniques described in this paper 
can substantially ease the specification of policies.  
Utilising FBAC, creating policies for applications using ex-
isting  functionalities  involves  assigning  functionalities  and 
specifying parameter arguments. In many cases the choice of 
functionalities is intuitive: for example, the gnobots game is 
assigned the Standard_Graphical_Application function-
ality, because that is the base-level functionality that describes 
the type of interface the user expects, and the Game high-level 
functionality, because the user expects the program to act as a 
game. However, in some cases the choice of functionality, and 
the values to provide as parameters, can be unclear. For exam-
ple,  selecting  platform  functionalities  (such  as  Uses_Perl) 
could require knowledge of the frameworks used by the pro-
gram  being  confined.  Depending  on  how  each  parameter  is 
defined,  parameter  arguments  can be  file  names,  directories, 
ports, or IP addresses. On a Linux system the files and directo-
ries that are used by an application are distributed across the 
filesystem  according  to  the  Filesystem  Hierarchy  Standard 
(FHS) [16]. Therefore specifying parameter values can require 
a detailed knowledge of the Linux filesystem. Automating and 
suggesting the selection of executable paths, functionalities and 
parameter argument values significantly reduces the burden of 
specifying application-oriented access control policies.  
An LSM-based (Linux security module) implementation of 
FBAC, known as FBAC-LSM, was extended to implement and 
test  these  automation  techniques. The automation  techniques 
described in this paper were developed during the analysis of 
the privilege requirements of existing applications. One hun-
dred and two applications were studied and a set of reusable  
functionalities were developed. In nearly all the cases studied, 
functionality  and  parameter  selections  can  be  suggested  and 
automated  using the  techniques that  were developed.  Unlike 
previous approaches to policy specification, complete applica-
tion policies can typically be specified without having to exe-
cute the programs being confined, and with minimal user inter-
action. 
III.  FUNCTIONALITY SUGGESTIONS 
Two techniques have been developed for FBAC-LSM to 
suggest functionalities during policy construction. Suggestions 
are based on the libraries that are dynamically linked to the 
programs or the dependencies of the programs that compose 
the  application,  and  also  the  icon  category  specified  for  the 
application. Functionalities are defined using the FBAC Policy 
Language (FBAC-PL). Definitions include metadata describing 
the conditions under which each functionality is suggested us-
ing  the  “suggest_functionality”  directive.  Multiple  “sug-
gest_functionality” commands can be defined for a functional-
ity, in which case, if there are matches with any of these, the 
functionality will be suggested. 
When the “suggest_functionality” directive is followed by 
“uses_library” the subsequent string is searched for within the 
dynamically linked libraries and dependencies of the applica-
tion’s executables. For example, the following line is included 
in the definition of the Audio_Player functionality: 
suggest_functionality uses_library ″libogg″; 
 
Libogg is a library used to decode Ogg media files. In this 
case, when constructing a policy for a new application, if the 
string “libogg” is found within the linked libraries or depend-
encies, the Audio_Player functionality is suggested.  
This analysis can be performed by parsing the output of 
third party  programs. The ldd (List Dynamic  Dependencies) 
command uses the runtime linker to analyse an executable file 
and generate a list of all the shared objects (.so library files) 
that are loaded when the program is run. For each executable 
file associated with an application policy, the ldd command is 
run by FBAC-LSM with the filename as an argument (i.e. ldd 
filename). If no match for the string is found using ldd, the rpm 
(RPM Package Manager) command is used to query the RPM 
database to retrieve a list of the dependencies for the executa-
bles. The following command is used to retrieve RPM depend-
encies: 
rpm -q -f filename –qf %{NAME} -R 
 
The “uses_library” strings that were identified during the 
analysis of existing applications, and the resulting functionality 
suggestions are shown in Table I. Any match to the left column 
results in all the suggestions in the column on the right. 
 
When the “suggest_functionality” directive is followed by 
“iconcategory”, the subsequent string is searched for within the 
icon categories the application is assigned to. For example, the 
following  line  is  also  included  in  the  definition  of  the  Au-
dio_Player functionality: 
suggest_functionality iconcategory ″Music″; 
 
On many Linux systems, files with a “.desktop” file exten-
sion are used to represent each of the graphical applications 
TABLE I: FUNCTIONALITIES SUGGESTED BASED ON LIBRARY USE 
Uses_library String (OR)  Suggested Functionalities (AND) 
libogg  Audio_Player, Audio_Editor 
libkmediaplayer  Image_Viewer, Video_Player, 
Video_Editor 
perl  Uses_Perl 
Mono  Uses_Mono 
Python  Uses_Python 
ORBit  Uses_Orbit 
java, jpackage,   Uses_Java 
xulrunner  Uses_XulRunner 
Ruby  Uses_Ruby 
kde, gnome, Qt, gtk, X11  Standard_Graphical_Application 
libtorrent  BitTorrent_Client 
Python-irclib  Irc_Chat_Client 
 that are installed on a system. These files are used to create 
icons that can be used to sort and execute these programs. In 
addition  to describing  other metadata regarding  applications, 
these files categorise programs. The KDE and Gnome desktop 
environments use the category to display the application within 
the appropriate program start-up menus. For example, the Op-
era  application  is  classified  within  a  file  named  “op-
era.desktop” as a “WebBrowser”. This information is used to 
place the program in the appropriate menu in KDE and Gnome. 
Figure 1 shows how KDE 3.5 uses the icon category to organ-
ise launch icons. 
The  maintainers  of  software  packages  typically  include 
‘.desktop’ files with applications so that they are placed in the 
appropriate menus. The available icon categories are, to some 
extent,  standardised  [17].  The  registered  categories  include 
these high-level main categories: 
AudioVideo, Audio, Video, Development, Education, 
Game, Graphics, Network, Office, Settings, System, 
Utility 
Adding additional categories to further specify the purpose 
of the program is encouraged. Many additional categories are 
also available. 
In many cases these icon categories describe the high-level 
functions the programs are designed to perform and correlate 
directly  to  FBAC-LSM  functionalities.  The  ‘iconcategory’ 
strings and subsequent functionality suggestions that were de-
veloped are shown in Table II. 
Although not a significant problem, functionality sugges-
tions can be subject to some false positives and false negatives. 
False  positive  functionality  suggestions  could  occur  due  to 
extraneous ‘uses_library’ substring matches. During the analy-
sis  of  applications  no  irrelevant  ‘uses_library’  substring 
matches occurred, although it is possible that an unrelated li-
brary  could  contain  one of  the  strings  used.  For example, a 
library named “monochrome” would contain the string “mono” 
and  the  Uses_Mono  functionality  would  therefore  be  sug-
gested. False positives can also occur when an icon category is 
more general than the corresponding FBAC functionalities. As 
shown in Table II, the icon category FileTransfer results in the 
suggestions:  Ftp_Client,  Downloader,  BitTorrent_Client.  At 
least one of these suggestions would likely be a false positive. 
False negatives can occur when non-standard or no libraries are 
used, or when ‘.desktop’ files are not provided. 
False positive functionality suggestions are unlikely to pose a 
significant problem as users must still make the conscious de-
cision to add the suggested functionalities to the application 
policy. Also, so long as the suggestions contain useful related 
functionalities, they are helpful. False negatives generally force 
the user to browse through the functionalities, when creating an 
application policy, to manually identify the functionalities that 
describe the features the application provides. FBAC function-
alities  are  assigned  functionality-categories  that  are  used  to 
group related functionalities and ease the selection process. 
During the construction of policies for the applications ana-
lysed, all platform functionalities were reliably and accurately 
suggested  based  on  the  libraries  and  dependencies  of  pro-
grams. In most cases the icon category-based analysis yielded 
applicable high-level functionality suggestions. 
 
 
Figure 1: Example of How KDE Uses Icon Categories 
TABLE II: FUNCTIONALITIES SUGGESTED BASED ON ICON CATEGORY 
Iconcategory String (OR)  Suggested Functionalities (AND) 
P2P  BitTorrent_Client 
Email  Email_Client 
FileTransfer  Ftp_Client, Downloader, BitTor-
rent_Client 
IRCClient  Irc_Chat_Client 
TextEditor  File_Viewer, File_Editor 
Archiving  Archive_Veiwer, Archive_Editor 
Music  Audio_Player 
Office;Viewer  Document_Viewer, PDF_Viewer, 
File_Viewer 
Graphics  Image_Viewer, Image_Editor 
Player  Video_Player, Audio_Player 
AudioVideoEditing  Audio_Editor, Video_Editor 
WordProcessor  Document_Editor 
WebDevelopment  Web_Files_Editor 
Game  Game, Network_Game 
WebBrowser  Web_Browser 
 
IV.  AUTOMATION OF PARAMETER VALUE SELECTION 
Automation techniques can also be used to automate func-
tionality  parameter  argument  selection.  Using  FBAC-PL, 
metadata describing automation methods for parameters can be 
specified  within  functionality  definitions  directly  after  each 
parameter  has  been  defined.  Parameter  definitions  typically 
include the default values, description, and type, followed by 
methods  for automating  the parameter  arguments.  Parameter 
value automation can be performed by searching for matching 
file and directory paths, and by using the default typical values. 
Parameter  automation  directives  start  with  the  command 
“parameter_automate”.  If  this  is  followed  with 
“searchforpathmatching” then the policy manager will search 
for any paths that match the subsequent string. For example, 
the  following  line  is  included  in  the  definition  of  the 
Standard_Graphical_Application  functionality  for  the 
peruser_files parameter: 
parameter_automate searchforpathmatching 
“/home/*/ .**[APPLICATION_NAME]*”; As illustrated in the above example, these search strings can 
contain constants that are represented within square brackets in 
uppercase.  Only  one  constant  has  been  defined: 
[APPLICATION_NAME], which represents the name of the 
current application policy being configured. Constants are only 
utilised by the FBAC-LSM policy manager and result in literal 
suggestions that the security module can enforce. That is, if an 
actual  parameter  value  specified  contains  the  string 
“[APPLICATION_NAME]”, it has no special meaning beyond 
its  literal  value,  it only  has a  special  meaning  to the policy 
manager for automation purposes.  
In FBAC-LSM the wildcard matching for parameter argu-
ment  automation  is performed  using  a  combination of  case-
insensitive  greedy  wildcard  matching  and  pattern  matching 
using FBAC-LSM wildcard matching. The result is that case is 
ignored,  and  an  asterisk  (*)  matches  any  character  except  a 
slash (/), and a double asterisk (**) matches any character.  
The  example  parameter  automation  line  above  therefore 
tells the policy manager to search the names of all the hidden 
files in home directories, and within all the files in hidden sub-
directories in home directories. Any files that contain the name 
of the application are added to the values for that parameter.  
Since the last character in the string is a single asterisk, direc-
tory paths will not be added, as they end in a slash. Examples 
of filenames that would match for an application named “app” 
are: 
  /home/cliffe/.apprc 
  /home/cliffe/.test/app 
 
If  the  “parameter_automate”  directive  is  followed  by 
“searchfordircontaining” the string following this is searched 
for  within  the  files contained  in directories  and,  if any  files 
within a directory match the search string, the containing direc-
tory is added to the parameter arguments. Pattern matching is 
performed the same way as described for “searchforpathmatch-
ing” commands. These example lines of policy directly follow 
the definition of the application_libraries_directory parameter 
for the Standard_Graphical_Application functionality: 
parameter_automate searchforpathmatching 
"/usr/lib/ **[APPLICATION_NAME]*/"; 
parameter_automate searchfordircontaining 
"/opt/ 
kde3/lib/kde3/*[APPLICATION_NAME]**.so"; 
parameter_automate searchfordircontaining 
"/opt/ 
kde3/lib/kde3/*[APPLICATION_NAME]**.la"; 
 
In this case, any directory paths within the /usr/lib directory 
(including subdirectories) that contain the application name are 
added. Then, if any library filenames (with the extension .so or 
.la) are found in the kde3 library directory that contain the ap-
plication’s name, that containing directory is also added. 
If  the  “parameter_automate”  directive  is  followed  by 
“usedefault” then one of two things happens during automa-
tion. If this is the only parameter_automate line for the current 
parameter and the typical values do not include any constants, 
the parameter is set to use the typical values without any modi-
fications. Otherwise, if there is more than one automate line or 
constants are used, any constants are replaced with their values 
and the typical values are added to the list of parameter argu-
ment values.  
When a parameter has no automation directives, the user is 
prompted to enter values manually. Otherwise the user is asked 
to review the values that have been automatically added. 
Using the developed functionalities to confine applications, 
the ability to automatically add parameter values was found to 
significantly expedite the task of creating policies. During test-
ing, this method of automating values was found to be quite 
comprehensive,  although  occasional  false  positive  and  false 
negatives  occurred.  During  parameter  argument  automation 
some false positives occurred due to the application name ap-
pearing within unrelated paths. This was particularly the case 
with applications with very short names such as ‘vi’.  
In the majority of the cases studied, the automated parame-
ter arguments contained all the required values. However, some 
false negatives were due to non-standard naming of application 
resources. Although the FHS does not define how application 
resources should be named, it was found that in the vast major-
ity of cases studied these resource names did conform to un-
written  conventions.  In  most  cases  directories  and  files  that 
contain  application-specific  libraries,  configuration  files,  and 
other resources contained the command name of the primary 
executable used to start the application. FBAC-LSM applica-
tion  policies  are,  by  convention,  named  after  the  command 
used to launch the application, and this name is used in the 
automation process. An example of one of the few applications 
studied that did not conform to this naming scheme is the Fro-
zen Bubble game, which uses the abbreviation “fb” for its re-
sources rather than the name of the command, which is frozen-
bubble. For example, the Frozen Bubble game uses files named 
“.fbrc” and “.fbhighscores” to store data in users’ home direc-
tories.  
Despite not being standardised, in the applications studied, 
file naming was consistent enough to facilitate automation of 
parameter values. From the perspective of policy automation, it 
would  be  advantageous  to  standardise  the  way  application-
specific data is named and organised. Standardisation would 
simplify policy construction for most application-oriented ac-
cess controls and would improve automation of parameter val-
ues  for  FBAC-LSM.  The  FHS  could  be  updated  to  include 
standard  or  recommended  ways  of  naming  application  re-
sources.  
Alternatively completely different approaches to filesystem 
organisation could simplify functionality parameters and value 
automation. The FHS specifies that the files for a single appli-
cation  are  dispersed  throughout  the  system  according  to  the 
purpose of each file. For example, the executable component is 
usually stored in /bin or /usr/bin and libraries are usually stored 
in /usr/lib. The number of parameters required would be re-
duced  if  application-specific  resources  were  organised  into 
fewer locations. Organising these files based on the application 
to which they belong, rather than the type of file, would sim-
plify  the  parameters  and  the  automation  of  parameter  argu-
ments. The GoboLinux project [18] aims to develop a Linux 
distribution that takes this type of approach to filesystem hier-
archy  organisation,  where  each  application  has  a  directory 
within /Programs/, within which all the files for that program 
are stored.  
A second source of false negatives occurred when applica-
tions required access to resources that didn’t exist when the 
policy was created. When an application has not been executed previously, per-user files will typically not yet exist for that 
application  and  these  paths  are  therefore  not  automatically 
added to parameter arguments. The FBAC-LSM policy man-
ager’s learning mode can be used to add these values to pa-
rameters. In the future a real-time access monitor could be de-
veloped to detect denied access attempts that match parameter 
automation strings and accordingly suggest additional parame-
ter values. It is expected that this would completely remove any 
benefit of running an application unconfined before specifying 
an access policy. 
V.  AUTOMATION OF EXECUTABLE PATHS 
Another aspect of policy specification that the policy man-
ager can automate is generating the list of executable files as-
sociated with an application. This is achieved using the whereis 
command to locate the executable files that share the name of 
the application policy.  
A number of the applications studied had additional execu-
table components of the application stored with each applica-
tion’s libraries. For example, when /usr/bin/opera starts, it in 
turn runs /usr/lib/opera/9.64/opera. Therefore, the policy man-
ager also searches for library directory paths that contain the 
application name and, if found, it adds an executable path with 
wildcards,  which  matches  any  executable  located  within  the 
application’s library directory. 
During program analysis these techniques for automatically 
selecting executable paths typically resulted in accurate values. 
False  positives  seldom  resulted  from  unrelated  library  paths 
containing the  application policy  name,  or  from  the  whereis 
command  occasionally  returning  non-executable  files.  False 
negatives could occur if the application policy name does not 
follow convention, by not matching the application command. 
Also, occasionally applications are composed of multiple ex-
ecutable files within /usr/bin. This occurred with three of the 
applications studied: lskat, amarok, and gftp. In the future these 
techniques could be extended to also look for similar executa-
ble names when automating executable path selection. 
VI.  DISCUSSION 
The techniques described in this paper successfully ease the 
task of specifying policy by making suggestions and by auto-
mating policy specification. In the majority of the cases studied 
these techniques were able to create complete policies for con-
fining  applications  while  allowing  them  to  function  legiti-
mately, with very little intervention required by the user. Using 
automation, the user constructing the policy reviews the paths 
(which are almost always complete), is asked to select func-
tionalities  (the  appropriate  functionalities  are  usually  sug-
gested), and then reviews the parameter values that have been 
automatically  generated.  These  values  are  usually  complete, 
although occasional false positives can be removed by the user 
and wildcard globing can be used to grant access to related 
resources.  
In  most cases complete policies can  be  created a priori, 
without executing the program. When extra privileges are re-
quired, these are usually few in number and can be added using 
the FBAC-LSM learning tool while enforcing the policy. This 
is in contrast to policy specification using other schemes, such 
as Systrace, SELinux, and AppArmor, which typically require 
those creating policy to perform extensive analysis of the re-
sults of learning mode output in order to meaningfully review 
the detailed policy that is generated. Users are often not quali-
fied to adequately analyse the low-level policies generated by 
learning modes. Also, executing potentially malicious software 
while creating policy can pose serious risks as the program is 
typically  not  restricted  while  the  security  system  is  learning 
from its behaviour. Using these other systems it is possible to 
build  policy  incrementally  while  enforcing  the  policy  being 
created; however, this can be a very tedious task as it can re-
quire numerous iterations. To illustrate, one particular partici-
pant in a usability study [14] was an IT security professional. 
He  tried  to  take  the  more  secure  iterative  and  enforced  ap-
proach using the AppArmor scheme, and found it too tedious 
and failed to correctly vet the rules that were generated. No 
tools currently exist for these other security systems to auto-
mate  complete  policy  generation  without  executing  the  pro-
gram being confined.  
The FBAC model is unique in its suitability for this type of 
automation. The policy abstractions map to high-level attrib-
utes, which can be detected, and the details that need to be 
specified can be deduced based on the functionalities utilised. 
These details can in turn also be automated. Future schemes 
that  also  provide  reusable  parameterised  policy  abstractions 
could also adopt these automation techniques. 
The  policy  automation  approach  presented  in  this  paper 
lowers the expertise required in order to specify application-
oriented  access  control  policies,  and  can  enable  security-
conscious  end  users  or  administrators  to  protect  themselves 
against potentially malicious software [14]. 
VII.  FUTURE AUTOMATION RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 
It is suggested that these techniques may be used to auto-
mate  policy  specification  for  other  rule-based  application-
oriented access controls, even those that do not natively pro-
vide the reusable abstractions that these techniques rely on. It is 
proposed that this could be achieved by exporting policy de-
veloped using FBAC to other policy languages. FBAC-LSM 
currently includes an ‘export to AppArmor’ feature, which is 
currently in development. This feature aims to allow policies 
specified using FBAC-LSM automation to be exported to the 
AppArmor security system. 
The techniques for policy automation described here dem-
onstrate the feasibility of the automation of complete applica-
tion policies. There are many opportunities for further research 
and  development  into  ways  to  improve  these  preliminary 
automation techniques. Linux package management data could 
be analysed to automate parameter arguments, utilising the list 
of files created for each program. Source code analysis could 
be  used  to  detect  likely  functionalities.  Binary  executable 
analysis is more difficult but could possibly also be used to 
suggest functionalities. Based on the analysis of the paths de-
tected during parameter automation, the policy manager could 
perform auto-globing when appropriate. For example, tempo-
rary files sometimes contain random strings that could be re-
placed  by  wildcards  automatically.  Also  a  run-time  access 
monitor could facilitate the addition of denied access when the 
denied resource path matches one of the automation strings. VIII.  CONCLUSION 
This paper has presented a novel approach for automating 
the specification of application-oriented access control policies. 
Unlike previous approaches, using these techniques users can 
typically create complete policies for applications without hav-
ing to run them first. These techniques demonstrate and lever-
age the FBAC model’s suitability to policy automation, and the 
advantages of reusable parameterized policy abstractions. The 
three tasks involved in specifying an FBAC application policy 
can  all  be  automated:  supplying  the  executables,  functional-
ities, and parameter arguments. These results indicate the suit-
ability of the FBAC model for application confinement, and 
present ways that the usability of application-oriented access 
controls can be improved. 
FBAC-LSM, which implements the techniques described in 
this paper and includes all the policies that have been devel-
oped, is free open source software available at: 
http://schreuders.org/FBAC-LSM 
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